	1584TERmsS Sent	cence
1	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT	
2	SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK	·x
3	UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,	
4	v.	14 Cr. 701 (VB)
5	SAMUEL TERWILLIGER,	Sentence
6	Defendant.	
7		×
8		White Plains, New York August 4, 2015 2:10 p.m.
10	Before:	
11		NCENT L. BRICCETTI,
12		District Judge
13	APPE	ZARANCES
14		
15	PREET BHARARA United States Attorney for	or the
16	Southern District of New MARCIA SUE COHEN	
17	Assistant United States A	attorney
18	JASON I. SER	
19	Attorney for Defendant	
20	Also Present: JESSICA MILLER	
21	Special Agent,	FBI
22	DANA KRAUSHER	1 - 6 1
23	Paralegal, Fede	eral Defenders
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THE DEPUTY CLERK:	United States of America against
Samuel Terwilliger.	

Will counsel please note their appearance for the record.

MS. COHEN: Marcia Cohen for the government.

With me at counsel table is Special Agent Jessica Miller of the FBI.

THE COURT: Good afternoon.

MR. SER: Good afternoon, your Honor.

Jason Ser, Federal Defenders, for Mr. Terwilliger, who is present.

And along with me is Dana Krausher of my office.

THE COURT: Okay. Good afternoon, everybody.

Have a seat, please.

This matter is on for sentencing today, the defendant having pleaded guilty to attempting to entice a minor to engage in sexual activity, in violation of 18 United States Code Section 2422(e).

I reviewed the following materials in preparation for sentencing: A revised presentence report dated April 30th, 2015, prepared by Probation Officer Susan P. Matthews; plea agreement dated October 22nd, 2014; defense counsel's sentencing memorandum dated July 28, 2015, as well as letters and materials attached thereto, including a letter from the defendant. Mr. Ser also submitted a letter to me today,

1	August 4th, attaching a letter from Dr. Alexander Bardey. I've	
2	reviewed that, as well.	
3	MR. SER: My apologies on that, your Honor.	
4	THE COURT: Don't worry about that.	
5	I've also reviewed the government's sentencing letter	
6	dated July 30th, 2015, and an additional letter from the	
7	government, also dated July 30th, 2015, correcting one aspect	
8	of its principal sentencing letter.	
9	I've also reviewed the psychosexual evaluation	
10	prepared by Dr. M. G. Berrill, which was prepared for the	
11	Probation Office. And that's dated March 20th, 2015.	
12	Has anything else been submitted that I failed to	
13	mention?	
14	Ms. Cohen?	
15	MS. COHEN: Not that I'm aware of.	
16	THE COURT: Mr. Ser?	
17	MR. SER: No, your Honor.	
18	Thank you.	
19	THE COURT: All right. Mr. Ser, have you read the	
20	presentence report and discussed it with your client?	
21	MR. SER: Yes, your Honor.	
22	THE COURT: Mr. Terwilliger, have you read the	
23	presentence report?	
24	THE DEFENDANT: Yes.	
25	THE COURT: Have you discussed it with your attorney?	

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THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

And, Ms. Cohen, have you read the THE COURT: presentence report?

> MS. COHEN: Yes.

THE COURT: The presentence report calculates the sentencing range as follows: The base offense level is 32. That's quideline Section 2G2.1(a). There's a two-level upward adjustment because the offense involved a minor between the ages of 12 and 16 years of age. That's 2G2.1(b)(1). Two-level upward adjustment for use of a computer. That's 2G2.1(b)(6). And a five-level upward adjustment based on a pattern of activity involving prohibited sexual conduct. That's Section 4B1.5. That adds up to 41 as the -- 41 is the offense level, minus three levels off for acceptance of responsibility, such that the final offense level is 38. The Criminal History Category is I, based on zero criminal history points. And therefore, according to the presentence report, the sentencing range is 235 to 293 months' imprisonment, with a mandatory minimum of 120 months. And his supervised release range is five years to life. The fine range is \$25,000 to \$250,000, all according to the PSR.

Does the government have any objection to the factual statements in the PSR?

MS. COHEN: Your Honor, I realized that there is -actually, in Paragraph 3, there's a reference to the

MS. COHEN:

No.

defendant's plea before Judge Smith on October 22nd. And in		
fact, the defendant's plea was before the Court on		
October 28th.		
THE COURT: Well, Judge Smith is also the Court. But		
yes, you mean it was in front of me.		
MS. COHEN: Yes.		
THE COURT: And it was in front of me. And I note		
that, but that's not a problem. I think you said that in your		
letter, as well.		
MS. COHEN: I actually repeated the information in the		
PSR, and didn't realize until		
THE COURT: Well, in fact, I took the plea. That's		
correct.		
Other than that, are there any objections to any		
factual statements in the PSR in front of me?		
MS. COHEN: No.		
THE COURT: Does the defendant have any objections to		
the factual statements in the PSR?		
MR. SER: No, your Honor.		
THE COURT: Okay. There being no dispute as to the		
facts, the Court adopts the factual statements in the PSR as		
the Court's own findings of fact for purposes of sentencing.		
Does the government have any other objections to the		
PSR or its guidelines calculation?		

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THE COURT: Does the defendant have any other		
objections to the PSR or its guidelines calculation?		
MR. SER: No, your Honor.		
THE COURT: Based on the parties' agreement as set		
forth in their plea agreement, as well as my review of the		
presentence report and my own evaluation of the guidelines, I		
adopt the guidelines calculation in the presentence report, and		
conclude that the final offense level is 38, Criminal History		
Category I, which yields a sentencing range of 235 to 293		
months' imprisonment. There has been no motion for any		
guidelines-based departure from the applicable range.		
Ms. Cohen, does the government wish to be heard on		
sentencing?		
MS. COHEN: Very briefly.		
Your Honor, the government requests that the Court		
impose a sentence in the guideline range of 235 to 293 months		
for all the reasons in our submission. It is our view that the		
requested sentence is appropriate here, in light of the		
seriousness of the defendant's offense, as well as the need to		
punish the defendant, and also the need to protect the public		
from him.		
THE COURT: Okay. Thank you, Ms. Cohen.		

I wanted to point out that Mr. Terwilliger has some

Mr. Ser, do you wish to be heard?

MR. SER: Just briefly, your Honor.

family members in the court to your Honor's right in the first pew. So he has, fortunately, some family and community support. One of them is his ex-wife who he remains close with, as well as his mother.

This is a very difficult case; in particular, given

Mr. Terwilliger's tragic childhood history, which I've outlined

in great detail.

The only thing I would note is, he grew up in a very, very serious mental health history.

I understand the government's concerned about dangerousness. However, I think the Court needs to consider prioritizing treatment for Mr. Terwilliger. It's clear that the issues he dealt with, which were well documented, when he was a young child, according to studies, can morph, and did, in fact, morph, into the personality disorder he now suffers from, according to Dr. Berrill. Dr. Bardey, as well as studies I've cited, have indicated that there is treatment that's available that could be successful for Mr. Terwilliger in the future.

Personality disorder is something that can be fixed with various modalities. And so what I would ask the Court to consider doing --

And ten years minimum is a very, very lengthy time of time in custody for someone like Mr. Terwilliger with no criminal history, never having before been in custody and having to be in custody with the history he has. It will be a

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very difficult period of time, regardless of the length. But
ten years is a very serious sentence, especially for a
first-time offender.
And I think what needs to be done is, he needs
significant and long-term treatment post-release once out of
custody, regardless of what that sentence might be. But I
think prioritizing under 3553(a)(2)(d) his future psychological
treatment, as opposed to enlarging a term of punishment to what
the government is requesting, I think we need to prioritize the
treatment. I guess that's the point I'm making.
So I've briefed everything in extreme detail. Unless
your Honor has particular questions, I'm prepared to submit on
my letter.
THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Mr. Ser.
Before I ask Mr. Terwilliger if he has anything to
say, your initial submission, you wanted to have it filed under
seal. Is that correct?
MR. SER: Please, your Honor.
THE COURT: The personal nature of so much of the
material contained therein. And I assume that's true with your
letter from today, as well?
MR. SER: Please, your Honor.
THE COURT: The government's letters are not on the
docket. Were you planning to file them on the docket? Or

should I just have them docketed?

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1	MS. COHEN: You know, actually, I held off on that,
2	because I saw that Mr. Ser had asked for the sealing.
3	THE COURT: Well, I'm not sure that you're saying
4	MS. COHEN: I don't think there's anything that needs
5	to be under seal in the government's letter.
6	THE COURT: The thing is, Mr. Ser's submissions
7	include all these reports and social services reports and
8	doctor's reports and all these things that are sort of beyond
9	the scope of just legal argument. Whereas, the government's
10	submissions amount to legal argument. And I think that the
11	government's both the government's letters should be you
12	should docket both of them under seal.
13	MS. COHEN: Will do, your Honor.
14	THE COURT: All right. Thank you for doing that.
15	Okay. Mr. Terwilliger, do you have anything you'd
16	like to say or anything information you'd like to present
17	before I impose sentence?
18	THE DEFENDANT: No, your Honor.
19	THE COURT: Okay. You can have a seat, then.
20	All right. Well, let me say first, that in deciding
21	the appropriate sentence in this case, I've considered all of
22	the statutory factors set forth in Title 18, United States
23	Code, Section 3553(a). And having done so and for the reasons

sentence of 144 months' imprisonment, which is 12 years, to be

that I will put on the record in a moment, I believe that a

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followed by 5 years of supervised release, is sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes of sentencing set forth in the statute.

This is a very serious offense warranting a very serious sentence. I've said this many times before, but the single most important thing to me in sentencing is: What did the defendant do? I am always interested in other aspects of sentencing, such as prior criminal record and the personal history of the defendant, and all of the other matters that are referred to in Section 3553(a). But the most important factor is: What did the defendant do?

And here, what the defendant did was engage in a concerted effort to persuade someone that he believed to be a 13-year-old girl to come live with him and to have his baby. The girl turned out actually to be an undercover FBI agent, but he certainly thought it was a 13-year-old girl. He repeatedly "solicited" the girl -- I put that word in quotes -- to send him pictures of her naked body. He also graphically described various sex acts he wanted to engage in with the girl, including sex acts involving the defendant and his girlfriend.

When the defendant was confronted about this, he admitted engaging in these sexually explicit conversations. He also admitted that on one occasion in October of 2013, which was actually after the conversations with the undercover had ended, that he had engaged in sexual intercourse with a

15-year-old girl while his girlfriend watched.

Having said that, the sentence recommended by the guidelines, 235 to 293 months, or roughly 19 and a half to 24 and a half years, is unreasonably excessive. The sentence in the approximately 20-, 25-year range for a sex crime, in my view, should be reserved for the worst offenders, and that does not include Mr. Terwilliger.

For example, someone who has committed a forcible rape or other violent sex crime or series of sex crimes, or someone who has prior convictions for sex crimes: That's the kind of person that a sentence in the 20- to 25-year range -- that's the kind of person for whom a sentence in the 20- to 25-year range may be appropriate.

But that's not the case here. The defendant did not actually engage in sexual activities with the 13-year-old. He wanted to do so, but fortunately, that never came to pass.

He has no prior convictions. This is his first arrest. He did admit to having sex with a 15-year-old, which is certainly a criminal act. But there is no indication that it involved force or violence. Indeed, I'm advised by Mr. Ser -- and the government did not take issue with this -- that Mr. Terwilliger was charged with rape in the third degree, often referred to as "statutory rape," in state court in Sullivan County. And that offense does not have as an element the element of force or violence. It's simply someone who's

over 21 years of age having sexual intercourse with someone under age 17. In any event, that's what he's charged with, with respect to that act.

The parties have stipulated to the advisory guidelines range, and I found that that is the applicable range. However, there are a number of aspects of the applicable guidelines enhancements that, to a large extent, artificially inflate the range here.

First of all, there's the two-level enhancement for use of a computer. Almost by definition, the enticement offense requires the use of a computer. And certainly, in my experience, the vast majority of people charged with this offense use a computer. So that two-level enhancement seems somewhat redundant.

But that's the least of it. The other things are that the defendant's attempt to obtain a visual depiction of a 13-year-old engaged in sexually explicit conduct caused the otherwise applicable final offense level of 30, under Guideline Section 2G1.3, to become 36 under 2G2.1. Of course, that's before three levels off for acceptance. But as I understand it, the base offense level here under 2G1.3 is 28. Two levels are added for use of the computer, which puts you at level 30. Unless the defendant attempted to obtain a visual depiction of a minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct, in which case 2G2.1 applies, and if the final offense level calculated under

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2G2.1 exceeds that calculated under 2G1.3, then 2G2.1 applies.

When you do that here, you start out at Level 32.

There's a two-level enhancement for use of a computer. There's another two-level enhancement for the fact that the minor -- or in this case, the person that the defendant believed to be a minor -- was between the ages of 12 and 16. So you end up at Level 36. So effectively, there's a six-level difference because of the attempt to obtain a visual depiction of a minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct.

This is a correct application of the guidelines as they are written. But in fact, here, no minor ever engaged in sexually explicit conduct to produce a visual depiction of such conduct. That never happened. And it could not have happened, because the person that the defendant believed was a minor was, in fact, an undercover FBI agent.

So the six-level increase -- it's not all at once, but the six-level difference, meaning Level 36 as opposed to Level 30, that's the correct calculation of the guidelines, but given that there was no minor involved in this, there was no visual depiction obtained, nor could it ever have been obtained, my view is that this six-level enhancement is not quite the right word, but the fact that the guidelines end up being six levels higher than they otherwise would be tends to overstate the seriousness of the offense.

And finally, although the five-level upward adjustment

for engaging in a pattern of activity involving prohibited sexual conduct applies, again, under the circumstances here, this adjustment tends to overstate the seriousness of the defendant's conduct. After all, the title of Section 4B1.5 is, quote, "Repeat and Dangerous Sex Offender Against Minors," end quote. But here, the defendant has actually engaged in only one criminal sex act with an actual minor, the 15 year old in October 2013, and he hasn't been convicted of that.

The other occasion of prohibited sexual conduct that would be considered under 4B1.5 is, of course, the offense of conviction, and that offense was an effort to persuade what turned out to be an undercover FBI agent to engage in sex.

Again, don't get me wrong. I am not finding that these enhancements do not apply. They do apply. But they really do not quite fit the actual conduct at issue here, which, again, is an attempted enticement, combined with a single other, but not prior, occasion of sex with a minor, without any indication that the other engagement involved force or violence, and where the defendant has not been convicted of a crime in connection therewith.

As I said a moment ago, the charge that the defendant faces in connection with that October 2013 incident is statutory rape. And under New York law, the sentence for such an offense, if he's convicted of that, is between one and a half and four years. Here, the impact of that conduct is to

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raise the offense level by five levels. In other words, if you		
add Level 36 minus three for acceptance, you end up at		
Level 33. A hundred thirty-five months is the bottom of that		
range in Criminal History Category I. If you add five levels		
and you end up with Level 38, 235 months is the bottom of the		
range. That's a hundred-month difference, and a difference of		
about eight and a half years. So a crime which under New York		
law would carry a maximum sentence of four years' imprisonment		
and a minimum sentence of one and a half years has the effect		
of increasing the guideline range in this case by eight and a		
half years. And that just strikes me as plainly unreasonable.		

The other reason why it's unreasonable is that that other offense, the one in October 2013, he hasn't even been convicted of that. But let's assume that he was convicted of Still, the effect of that criminal episode here is an eight-and-a-half year increase in the guideline range, which strikes me as unreasonable, considering that the maximum sentence for that offense would be four years' imprisonment.

Now, I do believe that the enhancements under 2G2.1 and 4B1.5 should raise the defendant's quideline range above what would otherwise be the applicable range. And if you go back to 2G1.3 where we started, the final offense level would If he started at 28, added two for computer usage, subtracted three for acceptance of responsibility, you'd end up with 27.

When the enhancements under 2G2.1 and 4B1.5 are factored in, then the guideline range is not 27, but rather 38, which is an 11-level increase, which is a dramatic increase. And there should be an increase. And I certainly agree that there should be an increase. At Level 27, the guideline range is 70 to 87 months. Of course, here, the minimum would be 120 months. But Level 27 is 70 to 87 months. Level 38 is the aforementioned 235 to 293 months. So that's about what? A roughly 14-year difference, which is a really big difference.

And even if you assume that the otherwise applicable range is 120 months, which I think is correct, because this is a mandatory minimum case, still, those enhancements take the case from 120-month range up to the -- basically, they double, and that makes it 235 months. So it's roughly a ten-year increase.

And again, I just think that that magnitude of increase, based on these enhancements which do apply, is not reasonable under the particular circumstances of this case. There should be an increase, but it should be a reasonable increase. And in my view, the increase that would be appropriate is about half of the increase that is called for by the application of the guidelines. In other words, instead of increasing it by eleven levels, I think a six-level increase would be more appropriate. And a six-level increase to Level 33 would yield an advisory sentencing range of 135 to 168

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months, which I believe is both sensible and reasonable, and takes into account not only the offense of conviction, but also the other incident involving the 15-year-old in October of 2013.

Now, there is another significant sentencing factor here that is relevant to me in determining the ultimate sentence, and that is that the defendant has a documented history of emotional and mental health problems since he was a small child. There is documentary evidence that he was also the victim of physical and psychological abuse since he was a small child, all of which is spelled out in great detail in the defendant's sentencing memorandum. And it's also summarized in Dr. Berrill's report. So I don't need to resummarize it here. I don't think there's any dispute about any of the information contained in Mr. Ser's sentencing memo or in Dr. Berrill's report about Mr. Terwilliger's rather unfortunate background.

Common sense and experience compel the conclusion that the defendant's criminal acts here, including both the offense of conviction and the other instance of sexual misconduct with a 15-year-old, are attributable, at least to some extent, to the defendant's troubled and abusive upbringing, as well as to his history of emotional problems and mental illness.

In short, the fact is that the 235 to 293 month recommended sentencing range is unreasonable, in that it overstates the seriousness of the offense and the true nature

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of the defendant's pattern of activity involving prohibited sexual conduct, and also the fact that the defendant has had, to say the least, a troubled background and continues to suffer from emotional problems and mental illness.

Based on those facts, I believe that a sentence of 144 months is sufficient, but not greater than necessary, in this case.

Now, I am acutely aware of the fact that while I have the authority to vary from the quideline range, that the greater the variance I think is appropriate, the greater the rationale should be for that variance. And here, this is a significant variance, because it's from roughly 19 and a half years at the bottom of the range to 12 years. So it's roughly a seven-year variance, you might say. And I recognize that that is a significant variance. But I sincerely believe that because the guidelines overstate to some extent -- I don't want anybody to get the impression that I think that this is not a serious crime or that I'm somehow making excuses for what Mr. Terwilliger did. I'm not doing that. But to some extent, these enhancements overstate the seriousness of his conduct.

He's not someone who's been repeatedly convicted of sex crimes. He has never been engaged, so far as we know, in any violent or forcible rape or some other crime of violence. He did solicit a visual depiction of prohibited sexual activity, but he didn't get one. And this is to be

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distinguished from cases that I've had where defendants have actually created visual depictions with minors, the visual depictions of prohibited sexual activity with minors. None of that applies here. That doesn't describe this offense at all.

And even when you factor in the other offense, which, after all, he self-reported to the agents when he was interviewed, I guess it was April 2014, that offense, as well -- and he hasn't been convicted of it, but let's assume he did it -- that offense, as well, does not involve force or violence.

So I just don't think that he should be sentenced as if he was a repeated violent sex offender, which I really believe is the primary target of particularly the 4B1.5 enhancement, but even to a lesser extent, but an important extent, the "visual depiction" enhancement, which is directed at someone who is not only engaged in an enticement, but also engaged in an effort to get a minor to engage in prohibited activity, and then create a visual depiction of that activity. I just think that under the circumstances here, those enhancements overstate the significance of Mr. Terwilliger's crime.

Let me just say a couple of words about the government's sentencing submission.

First of all, I agree with the government that a lengthy prison sentence is appropriate, given the seriousness

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of the defendant's conduct, the need to impose just punishment, and the need to protect the public from further crimes by the defendant.

The 144 months, 12 years, is such a sentence. It is two years above the mandatory minimum. It takes into account the aggravating factors of soliciting a visual depiction of sexually explicit conduct. And secondly, it takes into consideration the fact that the defendant engaged in sexual intercourse with a 15-year-old around the same time that he was attempting to entice what he thought was a 13-year-old to come live with and engage in sexual acts with him. It also takes into account the fact that the defendant has no criminal history, and certainly no prior sex offense arrests or convictions. It also takes into account the defendant's documented history of abuse and mental illness.

So while I agree with the government that a lengthy prison sentence is warranted, I emphatically do not agree that the sentence should be in the 20- to 25-year range.

I also take issue -- and this is, I suppose, even what I've already said about the sentence I intend to impose and why, this is in the nature of dicta, I suppose. But, Ms. Cohen, I actually think you're making a mistake to use Dr. Berrill's report as a sword. What you did in your letter is, you said, "According to Dr. Berrill, the defendant was unwilling or unable to accept responsibility." And you

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referenced certain things that the defendant had said to Dr. Berrill.

But let's remember, a report like this is prepared at the direction of the Court, not the U.S. Attorney's Office. It's prepared by the Court through the Probation Office to determine treatment needs and an assessment of risk to the community upon the defendant's release from prison. Dr. Berrill's report absolutely accomplishes those purposes. No question about it. And as a result, the presentence report recommends that the defendant be closely supervised upon his release, that he needs counseling and mental health treatment, including sex-offender-specific treatment.

In Dr. Bardey's letter that I received today, Dr. Bardey, likewise, recommends individual and group therapy, as well as psychiatric medications.

Secondly, Dr. Berrill's report was not done for the purpose of gathering evidence to be used against the defendant at sentencing. Indeed, if the government views such reports that way, and uses them that way, interprets them that way, which is exactly what Ms. Cohen did in her letter, it will have the effect of discouraging defendants and defense counsel from agreeing to undergo such evaluations. Again, this is an evaluation recommended by Probation and ordered by the Court. And it also will discourage defendants from being honest during these evaluations. And if defendants are discouraged in that

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way from either being honest or even agreeing to undergo the evaluation, that would be, to say the least, extremely counterproductive.

The whole purpose of the report is to determine treatment needs and risk assessment after the defendant is released from prison. It's not designed to discover new evidence that can be used by the government at sentencing to ratchet up the sentence or to otherwise support the sentencing position that the government wishes to take.

For what it's worth, my view is that if a defendant were to say -- or defense counsel were to say, "Look. client declines to undergo such an evaluation," I would be completely fine with that. I would treat that as a nonevent. I wouldn't hold it against the defendant. Of course, there might be some benefits that the defendant might get from such a There might be some things that an evaluator might say about the defendant which actually would help the defendant at sentencing. But I certainly wouldn't hold it against a defendant if the defendant or his counsel declined to undergo such an evaluation.

And I'm very concerned that if it's the government's position that this is a win-win for the government, because on the one hand, it's good to find out what the defendant's problems are, and in addition to that, if the defendant says some things or the doctor says some things which can be used

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against the defendant at sentencing to support the government's position for a more severe sentence, well then, that's great, too, the government might think.

I actually think that that is a perverse approach, because -- I suppose that's an ironic word to use in this case, but I really think it's counterproductive. That's a better word to use. It's counterproductive, because it's going to discourage people from undergoing evaluations which are in the interest of the Court and the public, in terms of determining what the appropriate treatment should be and what the risk assessment should be for the defendant once he's released from prison.

In any event, I don't even agree with the government that the defendant was -- the government says it showed that --"what he said to Dr. Berrill showed that he was unwilling or unable to accept responsibility." I think what it shows is that the defendant is an extremely troubled person with a serious antisocial personality disorder. That's not the exact words used by Dr. Berrill.

Hold on just one second.

(Pause)

"Personality disorder, as well as impulse THE COURT: control disorder." In other words, he's a highly troubled individual who doesn't understand fully the magnitude of the seriousness of what he's done. But it doesn't mean that he

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wasn't being honest. I think that he -- my impression of Dr. Berrill's report is that he was being quite honest with Dr. Berrill in admitting things which, if he didn't have these mental health issues and emotional disorders and other problems that he has, he almost certainly would not admit. Most people would not say --

You don't need to speak at this point, Ms. Cohen. I'll give you an opportunity to speak.

As I was saying, if anything, it shows that he was being honest with the doctor and not dishonest or trying to hide something or minimize his conduct. I think it shows he just has no clue. He's clueless about his conduct, which makes him a dangerous person, which warrants a 12-year jail sentence, which warrants extremely close supervision when he's released from prison, which he eventually will be.

But what happened in April of 2014 when he was interviewed is that he gave a full confession. What also happened is that he admitted having sex with this 15-year-old. The parties don't talk about this in the papers, but I'm assuming that at the time, law enforcement knew nothing about that other incident. And then, when he spoke to Dr. Berrill, he seemed to be completely open and honest about the incident, but completely or largely unaware of the significance of what he had done. But that's not the same as saying that he was trying to minimize the significance of what he had done.

admitted guilt.	He knew tha	t he was	facing	a ter	n-year
mandatory minimu	m sentence.	He volum	nteered	this	information
about the other	incident wit	h the 15-	-vear-ol	ld.	

Sentence

So whatever problems Mr. Terwilliger has, being honest about what's inside his head is not one of those. It's just that what's inside his head is screwed up, and that he needs a tremendous amount of help and support and guidance and probably psychiatric medication to turn his life around to the point that he becomes less likely to engage in this conduct in the future.

So as far as I'm concerned, the defendant did accept responsibility for his crime, and I reject the way the government has articulated -- or described, I should say, what he said to Dr. Berrill according to Dr. Berrill's report.

Yes, Ms. Cohen. You wanted to be heard?

MS. COHEN: Your Honor, I just wanted to clarify that the government's --

THE COURT: Honestly, I don't think there's anything that needs to be clarified, but go ahead. You're welcome to do it.

Go ahead.

MS. COHEN: I just wanted to make plain that the government's view with respect to the acceptance or the inability to accept responsibility was essentially due to the fact that he told Dr. Berrill that he didn't believe -- he

1	didn't think that the girl that he was talking to was 13.
2	And to the Court's point
3	THE COURT: Where does it say that in Dr. Berrill's
4	report?
5	MS. COHEN: It says it on Page
6	THE COURT: He said he waffled about that, and then he
7	acknowledged that he thought that she was 13.
8	And by the way, he had already admitted under oath in
9	this courtroom that he believed that she was 13. So for
10	purposes of the guilty plea, and, therefore, for the sentence,
11	there's no question that he admitted the elements of the
12	offense.
13	But go ahead.
14	MS. COHEN: It's on Page 7.
15	The government's point is simply that this is a
16	defendant who, despite pleading guilty, then essentially denied
17	the essence of the conduct, which is
18	THE COURT: I don't believe that he did deny the
19	essence of the conduct.
20	What do you say about that, Mr. Ser, in terms of
21	Dr. Berrill's report?
22	MR. SER: When it came to the 13-year-old belief, I
23	think if he waffled and I think his letter made clear that
24	we submitted he thought she might have been older, but he
25	admitted you know, he knew she was a minor. That's what he

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admitted in the plea colloquy.

I wasn't present at the interview with Dr. Berrill. That's one of the --

THE COURT: Well, he didn't know she was a minor, because she wasn't a minor. But he believed she was a minor.

MR. SER: Correct. Right. And if there was an issue --

> THE COURT: It turns out she was not a minor.

MR. SER: Right. But as far as the actual age goes, if he made some statements to Dr. Berrill about whether he didn't think she was 13 or not, he still thought she was a minor, based on the picture. Could have been a teen-ager, perhaps older than 13. That's what Mr. Terwilliger identified to me. And I think that's what was in his letter to the Court, as well. It's probably my best recollection of that report. know there was waffling. Your Honor is right. It was kind of inconsistent in places, but . . .

THE COURT: But you know, I think it reflects the fact that the defendant is a troubled individual with a real lack of insight into his own conduct, into his own behavior. And because of that, he's now facing 12 years in prison, which is a really long time to be in prison. And notwithstanding the fact that he didn't actually engage in a sexual relationship with the person who he believed to be a 13-year-old girl. consequences of his behavior are extremely severe, and it's

Sentence

regrettable that he does not fully appreciate that yet. But if anything, that just demonstrates what a screwed up individual he is -- and that's a nontechnical term, but an individual with such emotional and mental health issues that he needs an enormous amount of counseling and treatment in the future.

Anything further on this, Ms. Cohen?

MS. COHEN: No, your Honor.

THE COURT: You see my point, though, Ms. Cohen. If you use a report like this as a sword, if you turn this into "Aha. And in addition, he said to the doctor the following things," then what you're going to do — and you know, you do a lot of these cases. What you're going to is to discourage people like Mr. Ser and Mr. Ser's future clients from agreeing to participate in one of these evaluations, because they're going to say, "Look. If anything comes up in that evaluation that can be used against you, the government will jump all over it." And so that's going to discourage them from doing it.

And I'm telling you both right now, since both of you have been in front of me on other cases and will be in front of me on other cases, if you do not choose to undergo or have your client undergo one of these evaluations because you feel that there's a risk of that happening, that problem we're describing right now, I'm not holding that against the defendant. I'm just not going to do it.

As far as I'm concerned, the defendant has no

have.

obligation to undergo this psychosexual evaluation. In many cases, it's actually helpful to the defendant, both in terms of his own mental health and also in terms of the sentence that ultimately gets imposed, but not always. And when the government jumps all over what it perceives to be lack of acceptance of responsibility, then it has the direct, I think, counterproductive consequence of discouraging people from participating, not only agreeing to do this, engage in — excuse me — not only agreeing to be evaluated, but also being totally honest when evaluated. That's the effect that it would

So I'm not going to tell you how to do your job, but that to me is -- that's a matter of concern to me, because this is a report that I ordered. You didn't order it. I ordered it. And I ordered it because the Probation Officer recommended it, and the defendant and the defense lawyer consented to undergo the evaluation.

I did not order it -- it's almost as if you're using my order that this evaluation occur against the defendant, and I am emphatically not a member of the Executive Branch or the U.S. Attorney's Office, and I do not have my orders designed solely for the purpose of determining risk assessment and treatment, future treatment, thrown back at me as if I was the one who conducted some further investigation into the defendant's background and underlying circumstances of the

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That's not what this is about. And I don't want to case. be --

The effect of what you're doing is that when I read your letter, I think to myself, "Well, the prosecutor thinks that I'm like an Assistant Prosecutor to the Assistant Prosecutor." And I'm not that. Okay? I know that it wasn't your intent. I know that you were well-intentioned in this But you need to appreciate the consequences of what And in my view, the consequences of what you did here are bad. And maybe the next time, Mr. Ser's client is not going to undergo the evaluation, which is going to be to the detriment of the government's interest and the detriment of the public's interest.

MS. COHEN: Your Honor, I would only say that my understanding is that the evaluations are prepared because they help the Court, in terms of figuring out who is this person, what kind of risks do they present. And in the same way the Probation Office uses that report, the fact that you have a defendant who pleads guilty, and then goes to the psychiatrist or the evaluator, and says, "I didn't believe that it was a 13-year-old. I never had sex with anybody who was underage." And he tells you in his letter that, in fact, the reason he withheld that information was because he didn't want to get in trouble. I mean, so it's not that he didn't understand or didn't -- you know, he makes it clear that he knew he wasn't

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being truthful with the evaluator.

I guess my point is simply that I think that the evaluation, the government took issue with the fact that he wasn't honest, in the sense that he denied that he believed that he was talking to a minor.

THE COURT: Let me ask you this question. Why did the government not bother to arrest Mr. Terwilliger or follow up on -- I mean, I wasn't going to bring this up, because it seemed a little bit irrelevant, but I'm bringing it up now, because we are talking about, you know, the government's view of something like this. Why didn't the government pursue this matter for six or eight months after this conversation ended? Why was it not until April of 2014 that the government decided to do a search warrant or interview the defendant?

MS. COHEN: I don't have a good answer for you on There was a lag time with respect to when the lead came in and when it was acted upon. There's no question. There's a lot of -- you know, unfortunately, there's a lot of very worthy investigations out there, and sometimes they don't move as quickly as they should.

THE COURT: Mr. Ser did not make the argument, which he might have made, I'm not sure if it would have made anything of it, but he might have made the argument that the government's failure to follow up on this undercuts their suggestion that the conduct that the defendant engaged in

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warrants a 20- to 25-year sentence. If it was that serious conduct, you would think that the government would have pursued it more vigorously.

Well, for example, let's just say, hypothetically, that a victim called the police and said, "I was just violently and forcibly raped by So-And-So;" in other words, the kind of conduct, if true, that would warrant such a lengthy sentence, particularly if that person had some prior criminal history or prior sex offender history. I'm pretty sure that the police would have followed up on that pretty quickly. They wouldn't have said, "Well, we'll get to it in about six months. We're kind of busy right now. We'll get to it. It's just that, you know, you're going to have to wait six or eight months."

The point being that one could make the argument -- it wasn't made here, it does not play any role in the sentence that I'm imposing, that if the government really -- "the government," meaning the United States Attorney's Office and the FBI -- if the government really believed that this case warranted a 20 -- even more than that, 293 months, that's nearly 25 years, that this conduct warranted a 25-year sentence, then they would have pursued the matter more vigorously, and they wouldn't have waited six months, during which time, apparently, Mr. Terwilliger had this relationship with a 15-year-old. Perhaps if the government had followed up immediately, that never would have happened. I don't know.

Who knows? One can't really say one way or the other. But it tends to undercut this notion that what he did here is worthy of spending the next two or three decades in prison.

Sentence

I think we've discussed that enough. As I said, the fact that it was not followed up on and the fact that it may have given rise to this other incident that occurred with the 15-year-old -- in other words, the failure to confront him about what the government already knew he had said, they had the information. It was all, I'm sure, recorded and downloaded. I'm not saying that that justifies a lesser sentence. I'm not. But it does give me pause in considering whether the government really honestly in its heart believes that what Mr. Terwilliger did warrants 20 to 25 years in prison.

Anyway, the bottom line is that, given the nature and circumstances of the offense, the history and characteristics of the defendant, the sentence I intend to impose is sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the law, and provide just punishment for the offense. Also, it will afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct and protect the public from further crimes of the defendant.

Does either counsel know of any legal reason why the sentence should not be imposed as stated?

MS. COHEN: No, your Honor.

1	MR. SER: No, your Honor.
2	THE COURT: Mr. Terwilliger, could you please stand?
3	It is the judgment of this Court that you be committed
4	to the custody of the United States Bureau of Prisons for a
5	total term of 144 months, to be followed by 5 years of
6	supervised release.
7	The standard conditions of supervised release 1 to 13
8	shall apply.
9	The following mandatory conditions shall also apply;
10	they're on Pages 24 to 25 of the presentence report:
11	The defendant shall not commit another federal, state
12	or local crime.
13	The defendant shall not illegally possess a controlled
14	substance.
15	The defendant shall not possess a firearm or
16	destructive device.
17	The mandatory drug testing condition is suspended, due
18	to imposition of a special condition requiring drug treatment
19	and testing.
20	And the defendant shall cooperate in the collection of
21	DNA, as directed by the Probation Officer.
22	The following special conditions shall also apply.
23	Now, actually, Mr. Ser, I want to
24	You can have a seat, Mr. Terwilliger, for a moment,
25	because I should have brought this up earlier.

The proposed Special Condition Number 1 is essentially
home detention. I'm not imposing home detention. I'm imposing
12 years of prison. So I'm a little bit confused by this.
I mean, are you objecting to this, or not objecting to
this?
MR. SER: I will object to it at this time, your
Honor.
Generally, in the past, if I've objected to
conditions, I've been told by judges that it's their discretion
to decide what to put in.
I will object at this time, based upon the length of
the sentencing. I think that transforms it into a lengthier
sentence than is needed. I think the close supervision will be
more than sufficient, along with other counseling and treatment
your Honor has indicated you intend to order.
THE COURT: Ms. Cohen, why is this Condition Number 1,
home confinement, something in addition to the 12 years'
imprisonment, an additional sort of not jail sentence, but home
confinement on top of that? And that's what it seems to be.
It says, "You shall remain in your place of employment"
excuse me "your place of residence, except for employment."
I'm just confused by that.
MS. COHEN: I think it also talks about other

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involved in overseeing what activities --

I have no doubt that the Probation Office THE COURT: is going to be quite involved in overseeing the defendant's activities.

I'm not going to impose Special Condition Number 1. Ι won't impose Special Condition Number 1.

So the special conditions that I am going to impose are as follows:

- 1. The defendant shall undergo sex-offense-specific evaluation, and participate in a sex offender treatment and/or mental health treatment program approved by the Probation Officer. The defendant shall abide by all rules, requirements and conditions of the sex-offender-treatment programs, including submission to polygraph testing. The defendant shall waive his right of confidentiality in any records for mental health assessment and treatment imposed as a consequence of this judgment, to allow the Probation Officer to review the defendant's course of treatment and progress with the treatment The defendant will be required to contribute to the cost of services rendered in an amount approved by the Probation Officer, based on ability to pay or availability of third-party payment.
- The defendant shall not have deliberate contact 2. with any child under 17 years of age, unless approved by the Probation Officer. The defendant shall not loiter within a

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hundred feet of schoolyards, playgrounds, arcades or other places primarily used by children under the age of 17.

The defendant shall not have contact with the victims in this case. This includes any visible, visual, written or telephonic contact with such persons. Additionally, the defendant shall not directly cause or encourage anyone else to have such contact with the victims.

And I'm going to leave it the way it is, but it's not precisely clear who the victim is in this case. The offense of conviction involved an undercover agent. But in any event, I'll leave it in the way it is.

I'm not going to impose the search condition, which is proposed Condition Number 5. This is not a contraband case or a case in which there is some concern about the defendant, you know, engaging in or having contraband in his home.

I am going to impose the next proposed condition, which I quess will be Number 4 on my list. The defendant is not to use a computer, Internet-capable device or similar electronic device to access child pornography or communicate with any individual or group, for the purpose of promoting sexual relations with children.

Defendant shall consent to the use and/or installation of a computer program, which shall monitor suspect computer use of any computer owned or controlled by the defendant. programs used will be designed to identify to the Probation

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The defendant will participate in a program approved by the U.S. Probation Office, which program may include testing to determine whether the defendant has reverted to using drugs or alcohol. The Court authorizes the release of available drug treatment and evaluations and reports to the substance abuse treatment provider, as approved by the Probation Officer. The defendant will be required to contribute to the cost of services rendered, co-payment, in other words a co-payment in an attempt -- excuse me -- in an amount determined by the Probation Officer, based on ability to pay or availability of third-party payments.

And finally, it is recommended that the defendant be supervised by his district of residence.

And I state for the record that the conditions that I am imposing, both the standard conditions, the mandatory conditions and the special conditions, do have the effect of requiring very close -- not only requiring, but authorizing very close monitoring of the defendant both through his involvement in the treatment program, the fact that he needs to

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have a computer program installed on the computer that he might use that could detect the use by him of anything online of a sexual nature, and also that he's going to be required to participate in drug treatment.

All right. I find that the defendant does not have the ability to pay a fine.

Oh, in addition -- I'm sorry -- the defendant is directed to report -- this is a special condition -- directed to report to the nearest Probation Office within 72 hours of his release from custody. That will be a special condition of probation, as well.

I find the defendant does not have the ability to pay a fine, and, therefore, I am not imposing a fine.

Restitution is not applicable here.

I am imposing the mandatory special assessment of \$100, which is due immediately.

The foregoing constitutes the sentence of the Court.

Mr. Terwilliger, you have the right to appeal your sentence, subject to any limitations on that right contained in your plea agreement with the government. If you're unable to pay the costs of an appeal, you may apply for leave to appeal without payment of costs. A notice of appeal must be filed within 14 days after the entry of judgment. Therefore, if you do wish to appeal, you must advise your attorney to prepare and file a notice of appeal immediately. Or if you request, the

1	Clerk will immediately prepare and file a notice of appeal on
2	your behalf.
3	I don't believe there are any open counts. Is that
4	correct?
5	MS. COHEN: To the extent there are, the government
6	moves to dismiss.
7	THE COURT: Well, that wasn't really my question.
8	MS. COHEN: I know that at one point, there were
9	charges in the complaint. There was a production charge and
10	exploitation, attempted exploitation.
11	THE COURT: Well, the only thing I care about is the
12	information, because that's the only thing that brings this
13	matter in front of me. And there are no open counts. I just
14	looked at it. It's a one-count information.
15	Any recommendations to the
16	So your application is denied, because there's nothing
17	to dismiss.
18	Any recommendations that you'd like me to include in
19	the judgment?
20	MR. SER: Your Honor, that he be housed as near as
21	possible to his family and home in Sullivan County. And then,
22	although I don't think know, in fact, he won't be able to
23	take advantage of the early release, would your Honor recommend

the RDAP program so that he can begin dealing with the drug

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issues in custody?

Ms. Cohen?

Thank you.

MS. COHEN: No, your Honor.

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THE COURT: I know he certainly has had drug problems		
in the past. That's not his principal		
MR. SER: He was a long-term abuser of prescriptive		
medications; in particular, painkillers, and marijuana. I'm		
more concerned about the painkillers. But if he can get a		
program and he's not going to be eligible for early release,		
given the nature of the conviction, but he should potentially		
be able to attend and take part in the program itself.		
THE COURT: All right. The PSR does say that the		
defendant said that he admitted that he had used marijuana from		
the age of 16 or 17 daily up until his arrest, and that since		
he was about 20 or 21, he began using Vicodin or Percocet every		
day until his arrest for the instant offense.		
So I will recommend that the defendant participate in		
the Residential Drug Abuse Treatment Program. Doesn't		
guarantee that he's going to get the program, but I'll		
recommend it.		
MR. SER: Thank you, your Honor.		
THE COURT: And I'll also recommend that he be		
designated to a facility as close as possible to his home in		
Sullivan County, New York.		
All right. Anything else?		

1	THE COURT: My deputy just handed me a note about
2	registration as a sex offender. There is nothing in the
3	presentence report about that as a condition of supervised
4	release. There usually is. I'm not sure why that is.
5	The person who did this report is not familiar to me.
6	Obviously, I disagree with a lot of what's in the report, or at
7	least a lot of what's in the recommendation.
8	MS. COHEN: I actually did not catch that, either.
9	But yes, he is required to register as a sex offender.
10	THE COURT: Well, I don't have the exact language
11	of
12	Hold on just one second.
13	THE DEPUTY CLERK: It's one of the mandatory
14	conditions?
15	THE COURT: It's one of the mandatory conditions,
16	right.
17	Hold on one second.
18	(Pause)
19	THE COURT: This will be included among the mandatory
20	conditions.
21	MR. SER: It is in the plea agreement, your Honor. I
22	would point that out.
23	(Pause)
24	THE COURT: Okay. So one additional mandatory
25	condition of supervised release is that the defendant shall
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1	comply with the requirements of the Sex Offender Registration
2	and Notification Act, as directed by the Probation Officer,
3	Bureau of Prisons or any state sex offender registration agency
4	in which he or she resides or is working or is a student or was
5	convicted of a qualifying offense.
6	So that is now on the record as a mandatory condition.
7	All right. Thank you.
8	Anything else, Ms. Cohen?
9	MS. COHEN: No, your Honor.
10	THE COURT: Mr. Ser?
11	MR. SER: No, your Honor.
12	Thank you.
13	THE COURT: All right. Mr. Terwilliger, I wish you
14	the best of luck.
15	THE DEPUTY CLERK: All rise. This Court will be in
16	recess.
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